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INTRODUCTION
In his article, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics,' Professor
Robert Ahdieh examines the limitations of the economic analysis of legal
problems arising from one of the core assumptions of the neoclassical
economic model - the assumption of "methodological individualism." Under
this assumption, the individual is the primary unit of analysis and the influence
of groups of people is assumed to be either exogenous, contributing to the past
formation of the individual's existing preferences, or the simple linear
aggregation of individual acts.2 Ahdieh quotes Ludwig von Mises for this
point: "If we scrutinize the meaning of the various actions performed by
individuals we must necessarily learn everything about the actions of collective
wholes." 3 Under the assumption of methodological individualism, "analysis of
the social must occur by way of the individual," 4 with the social phenomenon
being the simple addition of the individual actions of the affected individuals.
There is no endogenous social effect on the legal problem that needs to be
examined, and there is no "gestalt" in the problem because the aggregation of
the individual acts is neither greater nor less than the sum of the parts. 5
* Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana
University, Maurer School of Law; Affiliated Faculty Member, Peking University, School
of Transnational Law; J.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1981; Ph.D., Economics,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1984. I would like to thank the Boston University Law
Review for giving me the opportunity to comment on Professor Ahdieh's work.
I Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REv. 43
(2011).
2 Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 50 (quoting LUDWIG VON MISES, HuMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONoMICs 42
(2d ed. 1963)).
4 Id. at 5 1.
Max Wertheimer, Gestalt Theory, in A SOURCE BOOK OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2
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Professor Ahdieh argues that, by making this assumption, neoclassical
economic analysis inevitably minimizes the role of larger social phenomena,
rendering many legal analyses incomplete. 6 In particular, he argues that this
simple analysis misses important aspects of legal problems involving social
norms, network externalities, coordination games, and information, because
these phenomena are inherently social and would be better analyzed using
larger social groupings as the basis of analysis.7 Professor Ahdieh gives some
specific examples of legal doctrines, the economic analysis of which might be
affected by relaxing the assumption of methodological individualism and
directly analyzing the effects of groups of people, or at least the possibility that
the impact of the group might be different than the additive impact of its
individual members. These examples include condemnation power, the
constitutional takings doctrine, and regulation of the financial markets.8 He
also points to some larger implications of his critique for the economic analysis
of law - that economists seem too much interested in dilemma games that do
not directly engage a social solution, too little interested in larger social
institutions and their impact on legal problems, and too taken with the positive
and normative implications of individual consent which are inherently made in
the context of social norms and coercion.9
Professor Ahdieh's article makes a valuable contribution to the law and
economics literature. Although in the past some scholars, including myself,o
have pointed out the potential limitations of the individual as the unit of
analysis for the economic analysis of legal problems, Professor Ahdieh
undertakes a much more disciplined and systematic analysis of the theoretical
problem. As Professor Ahdieh points out, there has been much more
examination of the potential limitations of the neoclassical economic
assumption of rationality in the law and economics literature than there has
been of the implications of the unit of analysis.' I Professor Ahdieh's work is
an excellent start on the theoretical implications for the economic analysis of
legal problems of relaxing the assumption that the individual is always the
relevant unit of analysis and that group dynamics add little or nothing to the
analysis of the problem. Upon taking this first step, it would now be useful for
(Willis D. Ellis ed., 2d prtg. 1950) ("There are wholes, the behaviour of which is not
determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves
determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole."); see also ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICA, in
VIII THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE Book H, 1045a, at 8-10 (W.D. Ross & J.A. Smith eds.,
Clarendon Press 1928) (c. 350) ("[T]he totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole
is something besides the parts.").
6 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 57.
Id. at 58-67.
Id. at 82.
9 Id. at 68.
o Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 389, 408-10.
" Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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Professor Ahdieh and other scholars to tie his critique into the analysis of
specific problems and doctrines and demonstrate the different analyses and
policy implications that result when one takes into account the importance of
groups in the analysis of legal problems. By generating specific policy
implications and conclusions that differ from the traditional economic analysis,
we can better judge the importance of Professor Ahdieh's theoretical work to
the real world.
I. THE ART OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
For the better part of the last century, economists have endeavored to
conduct economic analysis as a "positive science," analogous to the physical
sciences. The objective of this effort is to develop hypotheses that yield
accurate predictions about phenomena in the real world. 12 The process of
developing and testing hypotheses is fairly straightforward. Once the scholar
selects the subject of analysis, he or she makes simplifying assumptions about
the relevant actors and states of the world. As Professor Ahdieh points out,
two of the core assumptions of the neoclassical economic model are that
individuals are rational, and that the individual is the relevant unit for analysis,
i.e. methodological individualism. 13 Next, the economist applies the logic of
mathematics to the selected assumptions to derive the implications of the
model. If the assumptions are tractable, this step may take the form of
equations and the application of optimization theory complete with first- and
second-order conditions for an optimum. 14 If the assumptions are less tractable
or the author or intended audience is not familiar with higher mathematics, this
step can take the form of optimization arguments on the balancing of costs and
benefits. Finally, the economist uses the implications he or she derives to
make either a positive statement about how the world is or a normative
statement about how the world ought to be. In evaluating the efficacy of a
public policy for the purposes of making a positive or normative statement,
economists use a variety of criteria including Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks
12 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
EcoNoMIcs 3, 7 (1953).
13 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 48. The "neoclassical model" consists of a common set of
assumptions that have proven useful in analyzing a broad array of problems and which
produce mathematically tractable models. These assumptions include that: the individual is
the appropriate unit for primary analysis (methodological individualism), people act
rationally to maximize their utility according to their preferences (individual rationality),
preferences are exogenous, information and transactions are costless, and markets work
perfectly. HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 111-15 (2d ed. 1984).
14 See, e.g., ALPHA CHAING, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECoNOMICS 3-
5 (3d ed. 1984).
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efficiency, and social-welfare maximization.15 Economists evaluate positive
statements by reference to empirical data.'6
Although methodical, there is an art to economic analysis, as there is to all
analysis. That art is divining which simplifying assumptions one can make to
clarify the analysis, while still capturing the important aspects of the examined
phenomenon.17 Although critics sometimes characterize economic analysis as
"reductivist,"18 all methods of analysis inevitably make simplifying
assumptions. Life is simply too complex to reproduce accurately in social
science models, or any other system of analysis or representation, without
making simplifying assumptions and omitting some details. Besides, including
details that are not important to the examined problem only serves to
complicate or even obscure the implications of the analysis. However, if one
makes simplifying assumptions that omit important aspects of the examined
problem, the theory derived from these assumptions will not adequately
represent or explain reality. Indeed it is an important part of economic analysis
to complete the process by performing an empirical test to ensure that the
model and its assumptions are adequately grounded to reality to be useful.
Based on unrealistic assumptions, one can derive some very elegant and
logical theories that do not accurately describe the problem, or, worse yet,
mislead people as to the true nature of the problem.
II. PROFESSOR AHDIEH'S ARTISTRY
Viewed within this context, Professor Ahdieh's article is itself an excellent
example of the art of economic analysis, despite his challenges to the law and
economics orthodoxy. Professor Ahdieh is pointing out that, although it may
be an adequate assumption for analyzing many problems, the traditional
economic assumption of methodological individualism is simply not accurate
enough to yield the best economic models with respect to many legal problems
in which there is an important larger social element.19 In any legal problem in
which individual interdependence is an important element of the problem,
Professor Ahdieh argues that economists would be well served to take this
dimension into account in building their models, or in other words to adopt an
assumption of "methodological holism." 20
" VARIAN, supra note 13, at 198, 206-07.
16 Id.
'7 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 10, at 397-98.
" Charles D. Watts, Jr., In Critique of a Reductivist Conception and Examination of
"The Just Organization ", 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1516 (1993); see also Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Family Gatherings and a Dirty Little Secret of the Law and Society
Association, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1081, 1083 (1999) (describing a response to the
reductivist critique).
19 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 52-56.
20 Id. at 46.
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It is perhaps not surprising that economists need some prodding in this
regard. Interdependence among individuals in preferences, or almost anything
else, horribly complicates the mathematical models which are the hallmark of
the discipline. Endogeneity between the people as actors under the law, and
the law as a social statement by the people complicates not only the theoretical
analysis, but also any empirical test. Nevertheless, if Professor Ahdieh is right
that, with respect to some legal problems, better models and theories can be
developed by taking account of the interdependence of individuals and the
endogenous nature of the world, and I think he is, then there is no point in
sticking with the traditional neoclassical models just because they are simple.
Indeed, if better explanatory and predictive models of legal problems can be
constructed by relaxing the assumption of methodological individualism,
economists are obliged to develop such models to further their social science. 21
The remaining question is an empirical question: for which legal problems
does a model based on methodological holism yield better explanatory and
predictive results? Professor Ahdieh provides some very plausible examples.
As previously mentioned, he argues that legal problems involving social
norms, network externalities, coordination games and information, would
probably be better modeled by taking account of the interdependence of the
individual actors and the endogeneity of the social and legal aspects of the
legal problem. 22 Professor Ahdieh argues that analyzing social norms within
the context of methodological individualism ignores the inherently social
nature of this phenomenon and the extent to which people's preferences and
constraints are endogenously shaped by their interactions with others. 23 He
argues that network externalities, so common in legal problems involving new
information technology, raise issues of interdependent utility that the
neoclassical economic model does not take into account. The extent to which I
enjoy text messaging, or even my community, depends on whether there are
other people who can receive my texts, or share in my community.24 Professor
Ahdieh also argues that although economists have modeled many legal
problems as dilemma games, coordination games in which the parties have to
agree on a common solution are also common in the law and inevitably involve
a social determination of the solution. 25 Finally, Professor Ahdieh argues that,
21 As I have told my son Nathan, who is studying to be an economist and currently
working at the Federal Reserve, models are just models; they are not the truth, but rather
merely a tool for extending our reasoning ability and gaining insight into the truth. If you
can derive a better model by changing your assumptions, this is all part of the progress of
the social sciences. A social scientist should never be wedded to a model as an ideology or,
worse yet, as a religion. Like science, social science (and especially empirical work) is best
practiced divorced from ideology. See also the speech by Polonius to Laertes in WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3, lines 55-81 (Constance Jordan ed., 2004).
22 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
23 Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 59.
24 See id. at 61.
25 Id. at 63.
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in areas in which uncertainty and information are important, social
interconnectedness will also be important because the accumulation and
dissemination of knowledge is a social activity. Professor Ahdieh uses this
insight to discuss the recent breakdown of our financial markets.2 6
Professor Ahdieh has done a good job of beginning to tie his theoretical
arguments to the real world and demonstrate that they have important
implications for the analysis of legal problems, but much more needs to be
done. The criminal law would seem a prime candidate for Professor Ahdieh's
project, since criminal law doctrine is heavily imbued with social norms, and
the theories of particular rehabilitation and particular deterrence would seem to
have as their purpose the shaping of individual preferences to conform to
community norms.27 Family law seems another prime candidate that Professor
Ahdieh has not yet explored, since family members experience strong
interdependencies in their preferences.
Although Professor Ahdieh discusses some specific legal problems in detail,
in particular the recent financial crisis, the applications of his analysis to these
problems still need further elaboration. Most economists would analyze the
recent problems of the financial market as a problem of expectations rather
than knowledge or information - but expectations exhibit the problem of
interconnectedness of individual decision making that Professor Ahdieh wants
to explore. 28 What are the implications of his analysis for the regulation of
financial markets, and why is this analysis preferable to the traditional
neoclassical analysis? The best way to make the case that the economic
analysis of legal problems will benefit from more complex models that take
account of the interconnectedness of individuals is to build those models and
apply them to specific legal problems.
CONCLUSION
Professor Ahdieh has produced a very useful theoretical article. He has
convincingly argued that the traditional economic assumption of
methodological individuality misses important aspects of some legal problems
that involve social norms, network externalities, coordination games, or
26 Id. at 79-82.
27 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1.
28 John Maynard Keynes discussed the problem that has since come to be called a
"Keynesian beauty contest," in which investors make money not by picking the investments
they think best, but by picking the investments they think most people will choose:
It is not a case of choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one's judgment, are really
the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We
have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who
practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY
156 (1936).
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expectations because each of these phenomena are inherently social in nature.
Although his argument is convincing, more work needs to be done to tie his
analysis to real legal problems and demonstrate the superior results that can be
obtained by accounting for social relationships. If you like, Professor Ahdieh
needs to add some color to the very fine etching he has produced.
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